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AB STRACT 
In this paper a s imul t aneous equat ion model is employed 
to inves tigate the relat ive eff e c t s  o f : (1) e c onomic cond i t ions , 
(2) incumb ency , and (3) r e c o gnit i on of the p r e s ident ial p a r ty's 
candidate on the dual d e c i s i ons of the individual to p a r t i cip a t e  
and v o t e  in c ongre s s i onal ele c tions. M y  finding is decidedly 
negat ive regarding the e f f e c t  o f  e conomi c c ondi t i ons on both 
turnout and v o t ing for the p r e sidential party. I have , however , 
e s t ablished the relat ive effects o f  b o th incumb ency and r e c o gni t ion. 
ON THE RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION S: A SIMULTANEOUS 
EQUATION MODEL APPROACH 
Nairn H. Al-Adhadh 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The various models developed by investigators to explain 
political choice have stressed either objective or "materialistic" 
factors, such as campaign expenditures or economic conditions [ l] [6] , 
or have stressed subjective or "nonmaterialistic" factors, such as 
salience of the candidates, party identification and some aspects of 
incumbency [8]. 
In a society where achievement and success are largely attri­
buted to hard work and rational effort and where political structure 
results in political "education" which stresses the government reepon·­
sibility and ability to influence the economic well-being of the 
country, it is hard to reject, a pri.ori, the argument of the various 
investigators in this area. These arguments rationalized and 
presented some evidence as to the effect of the performance of the 
government in the economic arena on the voting decision, whether it is 
on the individual's level or on the level of the electorate as a whole. 
All things being equal, one would expect that a voter will choose to 
give his vote to the person whom he can recall by name in the voting 
booth rather than to a complete unknown. The catch words used here are 
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"all things being equal" ; the fact is that things are not equal as far 
as the individual is concerned. The question then becomes; "Under what 
conditions is the salience of the candidate transforms into a positive 
or negative vote?" 
Incumbency, on the other hand, has enjoyed a more celebrated 
place in the literature of voting than salience. It has been 
hypothesized that incumbency is used to bribe certain effective 
sections of the electorate through pet projects, etc., or to buy salience 
through the acquisition and expenditure of campaign resources. It can 
also have a certain magic which expresses itself through the saying, 
"The devil we know is better than the devil we don't." The real world 
is not polarized into objective and subjective elements; there is a 
dialectical unity in the world which underlies socio-political phenomena. 
To explain the effect of the subjective elements, we have to look for 
the underlying objective factors, and vice versa. Models which capture 
this essence of the real world are the only models which answer such 
questions as; "How do these factors influence this phenomenon?", rather 
than, "What factors are involved?" 
This paper examines the. responsiveness of the participation and 
voting decisions of the voter to the performance of the incumbent 
president. This examination is conducted within a framework of the 
political phenomenon of simultaneity. Previous studies which were based 
on a single-equation estimation procedure suffer from conceptual as well 
as methodological shortcomings. A unification of the "objective " and 
"subjective" approaches in one framework will ascertain their effect on 
the individual's dual decisions on participation and voting. The 
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emphasis, however, will be on the effect of economic conditions on 
turnout and on the electoral fortunes of the President '.s party in 
Congressional elections. Earlier studies by Kramer [ 1], [2], Stigler 
[3] and Arcelus and Metzler [4] use models in which the dependent 
variable is the parties' aggregate Congressional votes. Various 
macroeconomic indicators of performance such as inflation, employment 
and income serve as explanatory variables. 
The contradictory findings and the numerous methodological and 
logical errors prompted M. Fiorina to seek confirmation of the 
phenomena at the individual voter's level [6] . Using SRC ( 1952- 1974) 
data, he establishes that "a citizen's personal economic condition 
affects his Presidential vote, but for Congressional voting the findings 
are positive until 1960 and negative thereafter." He also observes that 
there is "no systematic relationship between a citizen's personal 
econo::aic condition 1md his decision to vote or abstain." 
The above l!)entioned models are single-equation formulations 
which ignore important determinants of voting behavior, making it sub­
ject to simultaneity as well as misspecification bias. This obser­
vation covers not only this study, but almost all studies in the field 
of voting. We could hardly stress the importance of simultaneity not 
only in the voting decision, but also in all political phenomena. On 
this, B. Page [38] writes, "Single or recursive equation models suffer 
from simultaneity bias, yet simultaneous equation models are exceed­
ingly difficult to specify in a plausible fashion." What is surprising, 
though, is that little effort has been expended to locate those aspects 
of the problem wh ere a simultaneous equation model can be formulated, 
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and where some exogenous variables can be excluded from some equations 
on a sound theoretical basis, thereby facilitating identification and 
estimation of the model. In the particular setting of economic retro­
spective voting, there is also the possibility that economic factors, or 
for that matter, any other factor may operate directly and indirectly 
through some specific variable on the dual decision of participation 
a nd voting for the presidential party. 
In general, the task is to take into consideration various 
simultaneity effects in order to answer a number of related questions. 
l) What are the relative effects of objective factors, such 
as the individual's perception of his own economic well­
being on both his decision to participate and his voting 
decision as opposed to informational factors , such as 
incumbency or saliency of the candidate? 
2) What are the underlying influences behind informational 
factors? Are there objective factors driving individuals 
to seek information about the candidates? What are the 
secondary channels through which an informational factor 
may also exert its influence? 
3) How do the effects of these variables vary over time? How 
do they vary between off-year and on-year Congressional 
elections? 
4) What are the overall effects of incumbency? 
In this paper a preliminary investigation of SRC ( 1952-1970) 
data is conducted to suggest the relevancy of various variables to the 
individual's dual decisions in participation and voting. Some testable 
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hypotheses will be developed. A simultaneous equation model will then 
be formulated. Simultaneity is captured through the assumption that 
incumbency as well as economic conditions directly affect the voting 
decision, as well as the assumption that it is indirectly affected by 
the awareness of the Presidential party candidate. It will be estab-
lished that there is no significant effect of e conomic conditions on the 
individual voter's decisions for all Congressional elections covered by 
the survey and for the pooled data. Other variables such as awareness 
of the President's party candidate and incumbency will show more 
significance in off-year elections than in on-year elections. 
2. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE DATA 
The task of this section is to probe the available data using 
simple statistical techniques to investigate the relevancy to the indi-
vidual's voting decisions of various variables which are considered a 
priori as being relevanr.1 Also, the interaction between these 
variables will be examined. These findings will be used as motivation 
for the simultaneous equations model. Various indices are extracted from 
the raw data in the SRC surveys (1956-1970). These indices will then be 
used to make some tentative hypotheses and observations. 
Three categories of party affiliations are considered: 
1
This is a common procedure in political science, but discussion 
of relevancy should be based on theoretical ground, not statistical 
ground. However, these cross tabulation techniques, in certain circum­
stances, are sufficient to prove some points without going to elaborate 
regress ion models. 
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Democratic, Independent and Republican.2 Also, three categories of 
respondents to the question regarding their perception of changes in 
economic conditions are considered: those who perceived "better" 
conditions, those who perceived the "same" conditions, and those who 
perceived "worse" conditions. For this purpose, use was made of the
following question in the SRC survey. "During the last few years, has 
your financial situation been getting better, getting worse, or has it 
stayed the same?" 
For the salience variable, use was made of a question in the SRC 
survey which asked the respondent to name the candidates for the House 
in his district. If the respondent could name the candidate, he was 
considered to be aware of him; otherwise not. The limitation of the 
data is mainly due to the availability of recognition data only 
for 1958, 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 elections. 
The results are mainly reported in the appendix, and the tables 
are suitably labeled as such by appending the letter A to the number 
of the table to distinguish it from the summary tables in the main text. 
Since it will be necessary to make some observation regarding the rela-
tive effect of certain variables over time, the tables show the differ-
ential values of these variables rather than their absolute values. For 
example, if a test is to be made that recognition of:t;he incumbent (Inc.) 
is increasing over time relative to that of the challenger, then 
2
For the purpose of inference from pooled runs, it would have 
been better to code the PID variables as follows: 
PID = 1 if respondent belongs to the president's party 
= 0 otherwise 
However, we opted for the three-way categorization D, R, and I to 
facilitate comparison with other works. 
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the relevant variable to observe over time is the differential recog-
nition of the incumbent. That is (the percent recognizing the incum-
bent minus the percent recognizing the challenger). This has simpli-
fied the form and inference from the summary tables. The interest will 
be in the number of entries in the original table with positive or ne-
gative sign, the magnitude of the entries (how much positive or negative 
are they?) and the number of cases which show increasing (t) or de-
creasing (+) entries over time. 
3. ON TURNOUT AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
The question is whether the inference from the data iupport AM's 
contention that the main effect of the individual's perception of his 
well-being falls on his decision to participate. We can postulate two 
hypotheses in this regard. 
a) The Apathy Hypothesis (A). This states that the probability 
of abstaining increases with betterment in the voter's 
economic conditions. Thus, it can be expected that a higher 
proportion of those in the "better" response category will 
be non-voters. 
b) The Protest Hypothesis (R). This states that the proba-
bility of abstention increases with the worsening of the 
individual's economic condition. Thus, it can be expected 
that a higher proportion of those in the "worse" response 
category will be non-voters. 
Let PB be the propor tion of abstention in the group who per­
ceived betterment in their conditions and PW be the proportion of 
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abstention in the group who perceived worsening in their conditions. 
The weakest criterion to test the Apathy (A) hypothesis requires that 
p > p 3 B - W, while for the support of the protest (R) hypothesis that 
PW � PB. To test the two hypotheses, the proportions of different 
party affiliates (PID), in various economic response categories, who 
abstained are calculated in Table lA. For example, in 1956, 29.2 
percent of the Democrats who perceived improvement in their economic 
conditions abstained. Tables l and 2 summarize the results. It is 
concluded that the protest hypothesis claims 75 percent of the cases for 
the Democrats, while the two hypotheses have equal stre.ngth in the case 
of the Republicans and Independents. As is clear from Table l, n o
general conclusion can b e  drawn a s  t o  the relative strength o f  the var-
ious hypotheses except that the protest hypothesis seems to be strongest 
in the case of Democrats. 
Table 1: Percent of Total Cases in 
Support of Either Hypothesis A or R 
Dem. Rei:. Ind. 
A R A R A R 
25.0 75.0 37.5 37.5 so.a so.a 
Total nwnber (n) of cases for each PID category E 8 
Table 2 shows for different PID's the average proportion of 
non-voters during on-year and off-year elections. The table presents 
3 
It is a weak criterion, because it does n ot insist on "complete" 
monotonicity, i.e., PB � 
P5 � PW' where P is the proportion of non­voter in the "same" economic response catggory. 
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evidence that lllid-term Congressional elections have a higher total 
proportion of non-voters compared to on-year elections. For example, 
the average percentage of non-voters among the Democrats during mid-term 
elections is 47 percent compared to 30 percent during on-year elections. 
Thus, if we accept AM's contention that economic conditions mainly 
affect partieipation, the result may imply that the economic-condition4 
effect is relatively stronger in mid-term than in on-year elections. 
However, the lower turnout in off-year elections may be simply ex-
plained by the absence of the presidential race. 
Table 2: Percent of Non-Voters 
on-year off-year 
Dem. 30 % 47 % 
Rep. 22 38 
Ind . 42 60 
w=4 n=-4 
Table lA provides, also, some evidence of increasing non-parti-
cipation over time. This is true for all economic response catego ries 
in all party affiliations. 
4. ON VOTING DECISIONS 
The Effect of Economic Conditions 
First, we seek some confirmation for the intuitive notion of a 
positive effect of economic conditions on the voting decisions. The 
effect of various other variables will then be investigated 
4
other explanations for this observation may be advanced. 
example, the voter may simply believe that his vote matters less 
term than on-year elections; or, that information cost is higher 
term than on-year elections, due to the lower level of publicity 
former compared with the latter. 
For 
in mid­
in mid­
of the 
10 
for different economic response categories, controlling for the 
presidential party's candidate and party affiliation (Table 2A). If 
the intuitive notion about the phenomena is correct, it is expected 
that a higher proportion of those who are in the "better" response 
category will vote for the candidates of the presidential party. 
Define P as the proportion of voters who favor the candidate of 
better 
the presidential party among those in the "better" response category; 
Psame 
and P
worse are defined analogously. The weakest test of the 
model is whether Pb � p , i.e., examining the two polar 
etter worse 
cases only. 
Table 3 summarizes the evidence by showing the percentage of 
cases which support the hypothesis. For all party affilia tes , the 
hypothesis passes the test with the support of more than 70% of the 
cases. The Republicans present the strongest support for the n otion 
that the individual's perception of his well-being has a positive effect 
on his voting decision. In fact, only 1966 deviates from the general 
trend in this case. 
Table 3: Percentage of Cases Which Support the Hypothesis 
Democrats Republicans Independents I m l B7.5% l ·z.s· l 
Total no. of cases for each PID category � 8 
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The Effect of Incumbency 
Kramer cla imed that incumbency has no significant effect on 
voting once the effect of economic conditions is taken into account. 
Table 3A s hows the incremental proportion in the presidential party 
candidates vote as a result of the incumbency of its candidates 
Thus, the more posit ive are the entries in th e table, the firmer 
is the inference regarding the covariation of incumbency and vote. 
Except for 1960 elections, entries are overwhelmingly positive 
(more than 80 percent of the 63 cases) , indicating that incumbency 
affects the vote for candidates of the presidential party. The effect 
is especially strong in the latter parts of the period. Table 4 sum-
marizes Table 3A. Consider that the first period includes 1956, 1958, 
and 1960; the second period 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970. 
Table 4 : Proportion of Party Vote D ue to Incumbency, 
Controlling for Presidential Party and Economic Conditions 
Democrat 
Republican 
Independent 
Source'; See Table 3A. 
Average of Entries 
in 56, 58, 60 
20.12 
22,64 
-13.l 
Average of Entries 
in 64, 66, 68, 70 
66 , 51 
50.56 
59. 77 
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Table 4 provides some evidence to support the contention of 
increasing incumbency effect over time on the presidential party 
candidate's vote in congress ional elections for all party identification 
categories . There is , also, some evidence that the effect of incumbency 
is strongest among the Democrats during the early part of the period 
while it is strongest among the Independents during the l atter part of 
the period. 
The E f fect of Candidate Salience 
Since Stokes and Miller's classic paper [20], in which they 
conclude that candidate salience has a positive effect on his vote, no 
one has challenged this proposition, except perhaps Ferejohn [ 8]. Thus, 
it is necessary to probe a bit further into the effect of candidate's 
salience on voting. Table 4A shows the differential 'V'vte of the 
pres i dential party can didate as a result of his recognition by the 
voter, controlling for PID and economic response categories. For 
example, during the 1958 election, of the Democrats (who perceive an 
improvement in their conditions and vote for the presidential party), 
the difference between those who know the incumbent and those who know 
the challenger is 17.l percent of the electorate. The more positive 
are the entries of Table 4A, the firmer is the inference regarding the 
effect of salience on vote. The following observations can be made from 
the summary Table 5. 
1) All entries are decidedly positive and reasonably large, 
indicating a possib le favorable effect of salience on voting. The 
evidence on increasing e f fect of s aliency over time is also 
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conclusive. 66 percent of cases support this observation. 
2) No firm general observation can be made regarding differ-
ential impact of saliency on different categories of economic conditions 
and party identification. For example, it cannot be said of the people 
who vote for the presidential party candidates and perceive betterment 
in their lot that the Democrats are more likely to recognize those 
candidates . 
For the moment, at least, it can be said that salience of the 
candidates is positively related to the voting decision of the indivi-
dual. 
Table 5: Differential Salience of the Presidential Party Candidate 
% positive % of cases 
entries in increasing 
Table 4A over time 
Differential 
Salience of 87 56 
The Presidential n "' 45 n "' 45 
Party Candidate 
(S1.1111111ary of the Data in Table 4A) 
Economic Conditions and Salience of the Presidential Party Candidate 
It can be postulated for this relationship a variant of the 
negative voting hypothesis: "The Avenger Model." In this model, the 
individual voter is most likely to incur the cost of information by 
seeking the presidential party candidate's name if he is hurt 
economically by the latter's policies . 
Table 5A tests the model by showing the covariation of the 
perception of economic conditions and salience for Republicans, 
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controlling for incumbency. Specifically, it shows the salience of 
the presidential party in different economic response categories, 
controlling for incumbency. Table 5B shows the same effect on the 
challenger's party candidate. 
For example, in 1958 there are 87.5 percent Republicans in the 
"better" category who recognize the presidential party candidate. The 
weakest test of the model requires that Pbetter � Pworse for salience 
of the presidential party. The evidence in this table seems to indicate 
some covariation between salience of candidates and economic perception. 
Moreover, the support f or the Avenger model is high, as 70 percent of 
the cases are in favor of it. 
Salience of the Presidential Party Candidate and Incumbency 
Several authors claim that salience varies positively with 
incumbency [11], [6]. To demonstrate the strong relationship between 
the salience of the presidential party candidate and incumbency, the 
differential of those who live in areas with an incumbent who belongs to 
the challenger party is calculated in Table 6A (controlling for economic 
responses and PIDs). For example, the table shows that in 1964, the 
proportion of the Democrats who recognize the presidential party can-
didate (in the "better" response category) and reside in areas with in-
cumbents belonging to the presidential party, exceed that of those with 
similar characteristics who reside in areas with incumbents belonging to 
the challenger party. The larger the differential (the entries in Table 
6A), the stronger is the inference regarding the effect of incumbency on 
the salience of the presidential party candidate. Table 6 summarizes 
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the observations made from Table 6A. 
Table 6: Differential Salience of the Presidential Party 
Candidate Due to Incumbency 
% Positive Entries 
% Entries Greater 
than 80% differential 
Democrat 100 80 n = 15 
Republicat ion 100 so n = 15 
Independent 100 80 n = 15 
The data seem to indicate a stronger effect of incumbency on 
salience for the partisans than that for the Independents. 
Also, if the 1958 and 1964 elections are considered as a first period, 
and 1966, 1968 and 1970 as the second period, then only four out of 
nine case s indicate in creasin g effect over time. 
5. THE MODEL ;\lilD ESTIMATION PROCEDURE 
The information in the previous tables is certainly suggestive, 
but firm conclusions have to await further evidence which takes care of 
the simultaneity effect on one hand and insures the proper control of 
all relevant variables in the problem on the other. The evidence in the 
data provides a reasonable basis to establish the relevancy of the 
various factors to the individual voting decision. For example, it is 
shown, given the limitations of the data and the tabulation technique, 
that salience of candidates, incumbency, and to a lesser degree the 
individual's perception of his economic lot, are related to the voting 
decision. Moreover, it is shown that incumbency and economic perception 
are related to the salience of the candidate. 
On participation, there is some support for the claim that the 
individual's perception of how well he has been faring economically is 
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related to his decision to participate or abstain. It remains to form-
ulate a model that captures the most critical relevant variables on 
one hand and takes into consideration the simultaneous nature of 
political phenomena on the other. The definitions of the variables in 
the model should facilitate the analysis of participation as well as 
voting decisions by using the same data base, whether for individual 
elections or in pooled form for all elections without redefining the 
variables. This kind of formulation will improve on the specification 
of previous models and reduce possible simultaneity bias. It will also 
exposit the primary and secondary influences of various variables on 
the individual's dual decision on participation and voting. A 
simultaneous two equations model is formulated. The first equation has 
the vote for presidential party candidates (or participation) as the 
dependent variable and the salience of the presidential party candidate, 
perception of economic conditions, incumbency, and party affiliation 
as explanatory variables. The second equation has the salience of the 
presidential party candidate as the dependent variable and incumbency, 
perception of economic conditions, education, and party identification 
as explanatory variables. A better specified model may be achieved by 
adding other variables, such as campaign expenditures and duration of 
incumbency in both equations. It may even be desirable to add a third 
equation for incumbency. While such modifications may affect some of 
the results obtained in this paper, it is proper to point out that the 
specification in this paper is dictated by both theoretical and practi-
cal considerations posed by the limitation of the data. 
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The Model 5 
where : 
y 
'\, 1 if o.1 + bl R1 + b2 F + b3 P + b 4 I1 + £1 > 0 
0 otherwise 
'\. 
R = l if Rl = 0.2 + cl F + c2 p + c3 11 + C4 E + c:! ::: K 
= 0 otherwise 
(1) 
(2) 
y is either the participation variable or the voting variable; 
that is, y = 1 if participating6 (or voting for the presidential 
SAnother model with interactive terms between party ID and
economic variables was fonnula ted as follows: 
y = 1 if o.1 + b
lp + b2 
11 + b3 (DB) + b4, (DW) + bS ( RB ) + 
b6 (PW)+ b7 (IB1).+ 
bB (IW) + b9 
Rl + £1 > 0 
= 0 otherwise 
'\. 
Rl = 1 if Rl = 0.2 + cl p + Cz 11 + c3 E + c4 (DB) + cs (DW
) + 
c6 (RB) + c7 (RW) + CB (IB) + cg (IW) + £2 ::: K 
= 0 otherwise
where Y1, f, I, Rand E are de fined as in the original model . 
DB = 1 if the respondent is a Democrat who perceives a bet ter­
ment of his economic condition 
0 otherwise 
DW = l if the respondent is a Democrat who per ceives a worsening 
of his economic condition. 
The other interaction terms for Repub licans RB, RW and for Independents
IB and IW are analogously defined . The results of this model are sub­
s tantially the same as were obtained from the original model [45].
6i<'or a different focus, see Campbell,et al, "Voting and Turn­
out" [40) or S. Verba, Participation in. America [42), where the emphasis 
is on factors that determine the psychological involveme nt of the indi­
vidual in polit ics .
party candidate) 
0 otherwise. 
R1 is the salience of the presidential party candidate where 
Rl if recognize the presidential party candidate 
= 0 otherwise. 
F is the economic conditions variable 
F' l:J 
where : 
F 1 = 1 if the response if "better" 
0 otherwise 
F2 
i f  the res pon s e  if "same" 
0 otherwise 
F3 if the response is "worse" 
= 0 otherwis e. 
P is the party identification variable 
P' - �:J 
where : 
P1 = 1 if the respondent is Democrat 
0 otherwise 
P2 = l if the respondent is Republi�an 
0 otherwise 
P3 = l if Independent 
0 otherwise. 
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The most interesting observation is the significant, negative 
effect of incumbency on turnout in comparision with a strongly positive 
influence of salience of the candidate. That is , incumbency increases 
the probability of the presidential party's candidate being known to the 
voter (i.e., increases his salience, which in turn affects positively 
the probability of turnout and his chances of receiving the vote) , but 
the direct effect of incumbency on turnout is in the opposite direction. 
(See Figure 1) 
Figure l 
Thus, the boosting of the salience of the presidential party candidate 
by incumbency works in the opposite direction to its direct effect on 
turnout. Is there any "apathy" theory lurking in the background? 
Could the individual voter reason for himself that the incumbent is 
unbeatable and therefore there is no efficacy for his vote? 
The answer could be yes, if the profile of the non-voter is 
postulated to be the same as that which emerges from Campbell et al. 
study [35]. 
"The non-voter tends to be a person of lower involvement whose 
emotional investment in politics and its partisan decisions is 
on the average much less than that of the voter. As a result, 
we would expect the non-voter to be less stable in his partisan 
inclinations than the voter and more responsive to the massive 
political stimuli that produce shifts of popular attitude over 
time. And we have little doubt that for the non-voter a sti­
mulus of great importance in this period, as in any other, was 
the fact of who was winning elections . . • •  The power of partisan 
choice to motivate turnout is contingent on the individual feeling 
that his vote may count." 
'(,., 
.,_e'I-
r,,.•Y" �"' 
cPe "'\.e� 
58 
64 
66 
68 
70 
64 & 68 
a 
Const. I 
0.68" I- -
0.20 
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Table 9: Turnout 
cl cJ: bl : b2 1 ·-i;;-1 b4 
Deni. Worse I Better I Inc. 1 Recog. Rep. 
0.14 -t �"+0.19" 1 -0.28" 1-0 .25" -
0.13 0.13 0.09 �.09 � 0.11 
1.60" 
0.27 
�5:._+-�6- -0.15 I 0.05 I 0.13 -t-0.14* + 1.5 
-;;1-I �To.as o.os o� 0.22 I 0.23 
_!!..:53!,_ 
0.18 
-0.25*+ 0�* _L:O� I -0.03 _ 
0.12 0.14 I o.o9 To.09 
0.12 0.02 
-0.31" + O.Bl*_ 
0.09 0.18 
-0.67* 1.3* �7��14- 1�2� 
o.2o--l 0.13 0.16 0.11 lo.09 lo.T7 �35 
0.30" 0.39* o.56* I -0.06 0 . 01 -0.20* 1.2" 
0.14 lo:J.il 0.15 I o:OS 'll.o9 lo."il9 lo.� 
0.79* l-0.03 0. 06 0.10 Q.06 -0.44* 1.5* 
-- -+-- -- -+- - --1- -- 0.06 to.07 ,__ -0.24 0.15 0.12 0.14 o.os 
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I is the incumbency variable 
Il l if the presidential party candidate is incumbent 
0 otherwise. 
E is the education variable 
E if the respondent has college degree 
.. O otherwise. 
Note that in eve ry variable, one category is not included in the 
actual regression model to avoid si ngulari ty and over-identification. 
Also, the definitions of the dependent and independent variables facil-
itate pooling of data from several elections to nail down the effect of 
some crucial variables. As indicated , the data used are SRC (1956-1970) 
election data. 
Although the salience variable , R, is observable an dichoto-
mous, it will be assumed that R reflects an underlying continuous 
� 
sa lience variable R with a threshold level of k such that 
�.2:k"""'R"'l 
� R <k�>R .. Q ,  (3)
This assumption justifies the use of a two-step estimation procedure. 
Equations (2) and (3) de fine a standard probit model; coefficients of 
(2) can be estimated by maximum likelihood procedure . These estimated 
� 
coefficients are used to construct R, whi ch can be used as an inst ru-
ment to replace R in (1), The rest of the estimation procedure proceeds 
analagously to the two-stage least square [47]. 
The two-stage probit technique is used in estimating the model 
for individual elections and for pooled runs. All tests of significance 
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are conducted at 5 percent level of confidence.7 
The Salience Equation 
Table 7 shows the result of the first step of the procedure: 
the regression of the salience of the presidential party candidate. 
Note that c 1 is the coefficient of the "better" element of the vector 
of economic condition F, similarly ci is the coefficient of ''worse" and 
c2 is the coefficient of the Democrat, while ci is the coefficient of 
the Republican element of the vector of party identification P. From 
these tables we can draw the following conclusions. 
1) Economic conditions have no significant effect upon 
salience of the presidential party candidate. Moreover, even the sign 
patterns are not consistent with a priori notions. The coefficients of 
the "better" and "worse" variables are overwhelmingly negative (more 
than 75 percent of the cases are negative) , which does not support 
either a nega tive or positive hypothesis regarding the effect of eco-
nomic conditions on t he salience of the presidential party candidate, 
even on considerations of sign alone .
2) Education and incumbency are both very significant in 
determining the saliency of both candidates. All signs are positive 
except for the case of 1964 where the coefficient of incumbency is also 
insignificant .
7The consistency of the estimates of the coefficients in this 
procedure has been established by Takeshi Amemiya [46]. However , he 
also established that the estimates of the standard errors in the second 
s tage are not consistent. This makes the distribution of the ratio of 
the estimate to the standard error in probit, not exactly t. This 
e ffect has to be considered when interpreting the results in this 
chapter. The significance test will be supplemented with a likelihood 
ratio test whenever two or more variables are examined at the same time. 
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3) Party identification bas no effect on the salience of the 
presidential party candidate during off-year elections. For on-year 
elections, it was only significant during the 1964 election. This 
finding is contrary to the hypothesis that one is more likely to know 
the presidential party candidate if the latter belongs to the same party. 
The Voting Equat ion 
Table 8 shows the result of the probit es timation of the voting 
regression equation (1) using the computed values of the salience 
variables from equation (2). Several comments can be made. 
1) Economic perception has no significance or even sign sta-
bility on voting decisions. That i s, the finding suppor ts rejection of 
either a positive or negative hypothesis about the effect of the 
perception of economic conditions on the probability of voting :for the 
presidential party candida te. A l,ikelihood ratio test confirms this 
conclus ion . 
2) Recognition of the president ial party candidate has a more 
significant effect on voting decisions during mid-term Congressional 
elections than in on-year Congressional elections . However, when data 
are pooled for on-year elections, the coefficient of salience is unambi-
guously significant and positive. This finding is solid, considering 
the degrees of freedom attained by pooling the data. 
3) The effect of incumbency is again more pronounced in off-
year elections than in on-year elections (although for the latter there 
are only two cases -- that of 1964 and 1968 -- perhaps not enough to 
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66 
68 
70 
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Table 7: Salience of Presidential Party Candidate 
66 
a2 
I- - -
S.E. 
-0.5* 
---
0.14 
-0.4* 
- -
0.16 
-0.7* 
,...__ -
0.14 
- - -
0.14 
-0.7* 
,___. -
0. 1 1 
-0.6* 
- -
0.07 
Equation 2 
cl 
Better 
- -
S . •  E. 
0.1 
,..__ - -
0.09 
-0. 04 
--
0. 08 
-0.14 
... - -
0 . 09 
-0.09 
1- --
0.09 
-0;!5 
- - -
0.09 
-0.08 
- -
0.05 
ci: 
Worse 
- - -
S.E. 
-0. 009 
,_ __ 
0.09 
-0.08 
<- - -
0.11 
-0.06 
--
0.1 
-0 .14 
- - -
0.1 
0.003 
- -
0.09 
-0.05 
-- -
0.05 
c2 
Dem. 
- - -
S.£. 
0. 09 . 
---
0.14 
0.5* 
-- -
0.15 
0.09 
cz 
Rep. 
- -
S.E. 
-0.04 
--
0.15 
0. 64* 
--
0 .16 
0.22 
_. - -- --· -
0.12 
0.16 
--
0.13 
0.03 
0.14 
0.22 
-� - -
0.14 
0.02 
CJ 
Inc. 
--
S.£. 
0.4* 
- -
0.01 
-0.07 
i-- -
0.07 
0.23* 
- --
0.09 
0.4* 
- -
0.07 
0.43* 
- - - - -'- -
0.11 
0.08 
---
0.07 
0.12 
0.1 
-- -
0.07 
0.08 
0.3* 
--· 
0.04 
*Significant at .05 level 
22 
C4 
Ed. 
'- - -
S.E. 
0.34* 
- --
.09 
-
• 28 * 
,__ -
0.09 
o.s• 
L- - -
0.09 
0.27* 
- -
0.08 
....,. 
Q.63* 
- - -
0.08 
0.5* 
---
0.05 
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support such a strong judgment). However, the model suggests a signif­
icant effect of incumbency in o ff-year Congressional elections . 8 
Again, when data from on-year elec t ions are pooled, incumbency 
becomes clearly significant. This is perhaps not surprising, and it has 
been pointed ou t by a number o f  scholars [6], [8 ] . These results show 
that both incumbency and salience of the candidate have strong, signif-
icant, and independen t  e ffects. 
On Turnout 
In this context, equation l is rein terpreted as a participation 
equation . The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (y) 
which equals one if the individual participates and zero if he abstains. 
The two-stage probit estimation procedure is repeated with the regres-
sion of equat ion (2) first , then equation (1) using the computed values 
of the recognition variable from (1). 
Table 9 shows the result of the second step of the procedure. 
Examination of this table does not support AM's hypo thesis on the e f fect 
of economic conditions on turnout. Except for the 1958 elections, 
economic conditions fail to show significant e ffect on turnout. This 
may lead to the conclusion that economic conditions have some e f fect on 
turnou t in the e arly part of the period examined. There are, however, 
some sign anomalies which cast doubt on this conclusion. For example, 
there is a neg a tive significant coe fficient for the "be t ter" variable 
in the 1958 case. 
81n reference to the observation made in footnote 7, it is 
reassuring to note the absence o f  sign anomalies in these coef ficients. 
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Table 8: Vote for Presidential Party Candidate 
(ll 
Const. ---
S.E. 
-0.2 
'-- -
0.22 
-0.43* 
---
0.2 
-0.88* 
-.- -
0.2 
o.58* 
--- -
0.2 
-0.94* 
-- -
0.16 
-0.5* 
---
0.1 2 
b. .L 
lnc. - --
S.E. 
2.0* 
,..._ - -
0.33 
0.15 
,_ _ -
0.33 
0.45* 
--
0.2 
0.51 
-- -
0.34 
0.56* 
--
0.16 
0.47* 
- --
0.15 
Equation l 
b_ L 
Better - - -
S.E. 
-0.01 
- --
0.11 
0.05 
--
0.08 
-0.01 
- - -
0.1 
-0.009 
- - -
0 . 09 
0.07 
- -· 
0.11 
0.06 
--
0.06 
b' 2 
Worse 
S.E. 
-0 . 07 
- - -
0.13 
-0.02 
-- -
0.12 
0.06 
f- - -
0.1 
-0.15 
--
0.12 
-0.02 
- --
0.11 
-0.08 
-- -
0.08 
I 
b3 
Pen�. 
,_____ - -
S.E. 
-1.0* 
-- - -
0.18 
0.18 
� - - -
0 .22 
o.7• 
0.13 
0.62* 
---
0.15 
-0.55* 
- - --
0.14 
0.55* 
-· -
0.11 
b' 3 
Rep, 
�- -
S.E. 
0.98* 
- -
0.17 
0.17 
- -· 
0.27 
-0:4* 
- - -
0.16 
-0.64* 
-- -
0.18 
0 . 89 * 
- -
0.13 
-0.68* 
--
o.p 
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b4 I 
Sa�c1� 
S.E. I 
-0.31 
-- -
0.16 
0.16* 
-- - -
0.08 
I I 
- -�3:_1 
0.1 
0. 1 2 
---� 
0.17 
·- -
0.45* 
- --· 
0.11 
·-
0.21* 
-·· �.06-1
I n  o th e r  words , the woul d-b e no n-v o t e r :  
I ) i s  mos t likely t o  have w e ak p r e f erence s , 
2) is mos t like ly to f avor t h e  i n c umb en t .
I f  we add t o  thi s  a f u r th e r  a s s ump t ion tha t 
2 7  
3 )  h e  i s  mo s t  lik ely t o  b e l i ev e  tha t the incumb en t  w o ul d  b e  
t h e  w i nne r , wh ich leads h i m  t o  b e l i eve that h i s  v o t e  i s  o f  
low e f f i cacy , 
then th e would-be non- vo t er in C ampb e l l  e t  al . s tudy w i l l  be a non-vo t e r . 
Conclus ion 
No s i gn i f i c an t  e f f e c t  of the in dividual ' s  e c on omi c cond i t i on 
was f ound on e i th e r  h i s  v o t in g  or p a r t i c ip a t ion d e c i s i on s . There i s  
evidence t o  sup p o r t  t h e  c ommon b e l i e f  that s a l i en c e  o f  the cand i d a t e s  
and incumbency a f f e c t  the ind ividual ' s  dual d e c i s i on . In p a r t i cular , 
in cumbency a f f e c t s  the individual ' s  dual d e c i s ion b o th d i re c t ly and 
ind i r e c t l y  t hro ugh the awarene s s  va r i ab l e . Th e s imu l t aneous e q ua t i ons 
f o rnmlat i on sugge s t s  t hat p o s s i b l e  mi s s p e c i f i c a t ion in AM' s mo d e l  
is  r e s p on s i b l e  f o r  t h e i r  r e s ul t s  that , " The p r in c i p le e f f e c t  o f  
in cumb e n cy is t o  in c r e a s e  p ar t i c i p a t ion . "  T h e  d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o f  
in cumb e n cy on p ar t i c ip a t i on appears t o  b e  n e g a t ive , a l th o ugh i t  has a 
p o s i t ive ind i r e c t  e f f e c t  thr ough the s al i ence variab l e .  Finally , we 
f in d  no e f f e c t  of e c onomi c  cond i t i on s  on t h e  awarene s s  of t h e  c and i d a t e s  
b y  t h e  individua l . 
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Tab l e  lA : Turnout 
""' Q:� * 56 5 8  "'.o 0¢. <';� o, o� 
<.,, ·� - -Q (> 
B e t t er 2 9 . 2  4 1 . 0  
Same 3 0 . 2 4 0 . 6  
Wo r s e  3 1 . l  5 2 . 1  
T o t a l  % 
non-vo t er s  30 . l  4 3 . 9  
,, ,� 
* 5 6 5 8  I � o,, "'<'I OQ O� <'- - -'5'Q '<'(. I 
B e t t e r  3 0 . 4  39 . 4  I 
Same 2 6 . 7 62 . 5 
Wo r s e  4 3 . 8 7 0 . 4  
T o t a l  % 30 . 3  5 7 . 8  
non-vo t e r s  '<> to(>� �:o 0¢. Q * 5 6 5 8 0 0 '°'<-'?'5' 0'<'. + -(l ' n 
B e t t er 2 2 . 0  3 4 . 6
Same 2 7 . 2 3 6 . 3 
Wo r s e  1 9 . 2 5 0 . 5  
T o t a l  % Inon-vo t e r s  2 3 . 6 3 8 . 0  
*on-ye ar elect ions 
For Demo cr a t s  
* 6 0 6 2  * 64
(+) - -
2 5 . 0  4 2 . 4  2 8 . 3  
24 . 9 4 6 . 2  3 2 . l  
2 4 . 7 44 . 6  3 2 . 0 
24 . 9 4 4 . 5  3 0 . 3
Fo r Inde penden ts 
* 6 0 6 2  * 6 4
- + -
2 9 . 7 6 5 . 7 5 0 . 0  
2 3 . 1 5 0 . 0  3 5 . 7
5 3 . 8  4 5 . 0  5 7 . 9  
3 0 . 5 5 5 . 4  4 7 . 2  
---·-� 
Fo r Repub li cans 
* 60 62 * 6 4
- n 
1 2 . 8  3 4 , 5  1 3 . 7
1 2 . 4  3 5 . 2  2 2 . 1  
1 4 . 3 3 4 . 4  2 0 . 5
1 6 . 7 34 . 8  18 . 1  
6 6  *6� I 7 0  + - ·- 1----
4 5 . 6  31 . 3  : 5 7 . 8  
4 0 . 7
i 
3 5 . 5  I 4 8 . 4  
5 1 . 7 3 8 . l  I 5 3 . 9  
4 5 . 5  3 6 . 4 5 2 . 8 
6 6  * 6 8 7 0  
+ + + 
6 7 . 3  6 2 . 8 7 0 . 8
5 9 . 3  3 5 . 7 I 5 5 . 3
64 . 5  5 5 . 2 6 3 . 6
6 3 . 4  5 0 . 9  6 5 . 7  
+ + n 
66 i • 6 8  t 7 0  
-,·utn.• " . , 
3 6 . 7 2 5 . 5 4 6 . 8
2 8 . 8  2 4 . 7 3 7 . 9  
3 6  . t. 2 7 . 6  " 4 1 . 7
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
t 
n do e s  no t s uppo r t  e i the r hypo the s is 
+ s u p p o r t s  "ap a thy " hypo the s i s  
Economi c condi t i ons and turnout,
e n t ri e s  a r e  % non-v o t e r s  o f
p ar t i cular p a r ty affili ation in 
va rious e conomic response cate­
go ries . 
- suppo r t s  " p r o te s t " 
t in creas i ng over time 
Better 
Same 
Worse 
Better 
Same 
Worse 
!Better 
ISame 
rworse 
* 
Table 2A: Economi. c Conditions and the Plurali ty of the 
Presidential Par t y  Candidates .  
( Entries are the Pres idential Party Plurality . )  
DEMOCRAT 
* 5 6 *5 8 * 6 0 *6 2 64 6 6  
-L1 8  . 1  - 3 5 . 2 - 5 8 . 6  4 4 . 5  5 0 . 3  3 2 . 8  
- 5 8 . 8  - 5 5 . 5  - 5 6 . 8  4 3 . 4  5 5 . 8  3 6 . 9  
- 5 7 . 9  -44 . 1  - 6 3 . 2  l1 3  . 8  5 2 . 0 4 0 . 1  
I NDEPENDENT 
*5 6 *5 8 * 6 0 *6 2 6 4  6 6  
3 3 . 9  1 2 . 0  1 6 . 2  1 7 . 1  7 . 2  8 . 2  
10 . 0  - 5 . 3  0 7 . 2  4 2 . 9  - 7 . 4 
3 1 . 3  7 . 4 -3 0 . 8  1 5 . 0  31 . 5  9 . 7  
REPUBLICAN 
* 5 6 
I 
"'5 8 * 6 0 * 6 2 * 6 4 6 6  
64 . 1  I Lr4 . 8 6 2 . 4  -4 3 . 5  - 3 7  . 9  - 3 6 . 8 
5 9 . 0  I 4 3 . 5  6 1. 8 - 4 4 . 3 - 4 3 . 3  -4 2 . 0  6 0 . 9  4 1 . 0  4 6 . 7  - 5 1 . 5  - 5 2 . 3  - 3 4 . 0  
* 6 8
3 6 . 6  
3 7 o 3  
2 6 . 3  
* 6 8
0 
7 . 1  
-10 . 4  
* 6 8
- 4 6 . 6  
- 4 6 . 3 
- 5 9 . 5  
Support the hypothesis . 
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*7 0 
- 2 8 . 2  
- 3 8 . 9  
- 31 . 6  
7 0  
- 1 2 . 5  
- 2 . 6  
- 6 . 0  
*7 0
4 0 . 6  
3 8 . 0  
3 7 . 9  
30 
Table 3A : Incumbency Effect on Vote 
(For all PID ' s )
Be t ter 
5 6  5 8  6 0  
Dem 10 68 . 6  -4 2 . 9  
Rep 3 0 . 9  4 1 . 6  1 0  
Ind 5 1 . 7 5 0  - 2 5  
5 6 5 8 6 0 
Dem 30 2 0  - 9  
Rep 5 0 . 0  4 5 . 3  - 1 7 . 7  
Ind - 1 4  2 0  -100 
56 5 8  6 0  
Dem 4 0 . 0  2 5 . 0  3 9 . 4  
Rep 30 . 4  2 6 . 5  - 1 3 . 2  
Ind 4 . 0 3 3 . 4  - 3 3 . 2  
Entries are : 
(Proportion who voted for 
the presidential party 
6 4  
30 
2 0 . 4  
8 . 3  
Worse 
6 4  
4 6 . 7  
1 6 . 7 
-14 
Same 
6 4  
4 0 . 9  
4 2 . 8 
4 6 . 6  
and reside in an area with minus 
in cumbents belonging to the 
presidential party . )  
+ in creas ing over t ime 
� decreasing over time 
6 6  6 8  7 0  
6 1 . 9 1 8 . 7  7 7  . 8  t 
3 0 . 0  8 l . 5  10 . 5  t 
9 2 . 3  4 2 . 8  5 0  t 
6 6  6 8  I 7 0  
84 . 2  1 7 . 3 9 0 . 9  t 
8 4 . 2  1 0  7 . 0  <=> 
100 4 0 . 0  8 0  t 
6 6  6 8  7 0  
5 0 . 0  3 0 . 2  50 . 0  t 
8 7 . 5  5 5 . 6  2 . 8  t 
7 7  . 8  2 6 . 6  - 1 2 . 5  t 
(Proportion who voted for 
the presidential party 
and reside in an area with 
a challenger party 
incumbent . )  
�> No trend 
n n 
Table 4A : Pre sidential Party Dif fe rential Vote and Sal ience 
Control l ing for Di f f e rent Party Af f i l i a t ion / Economic 
Re sponse Cate gories 
Firs t Pe riod S econ d  Pe riod 
5 8 6 4  I 6 6  6 8  7 0  
Dem/better 1 7 . 1  2 5 . 5  I 2 3 . 8  15 . 8  4 4 . 4  I t 
Dem/ s ame 14 . 3  2 9 . 7 1 7 . 3 3 5  2 5  I t 
I 
D em/wo r s e 6 0 . 0  2 8 . 0  I 3 1 . 6  2 6 . 9 4 5 . 5  I -t Ind / b e t t er 1 6 . 6  2 7 . 0  I 4 0  2 5  0 �> 
Ind / s ame 2 2 . 2  2 5 . 0  . 2 2 . 2 2 6 . 6  0 I -t 
Ind/worse 0 0 0 2 0  8 0  I t 
Rep / b etter 2 3 . 2 1 1 . 4 I 4 6 . 2  14 . 3  1 8 . 9 I t 
Rep / s ame 1 6 . 5  3 7 . 0  3 1 . 2 2 2 . 2 2 7 . 8  I t 
Rep /wor se 25 . 0  0 31 . 5 2 8 . 6  2 4 . 2 I t 
L_ 
Entri es are : 
(P roportion of a c ate gory (Proportion of the s ame 
of re s p on dents who voted category who voted for the 
for the p re s idential p ar ty minus p residential p arty an d 
and re cognise the p re s- re cognize the challenger 
idential p arty ' s  c an didate . ) p arty ' s  c an didate . )  
Tab le 5 A :  S alience and Economic Conditions 
�� �  �<'o J> 0�Po �� .s'��-<,., � 1§8 164 16 6 6 8  �o Better 8 7 . 5  8 1 . 3 80 8 3 . 3  6 3 . 6  
Same 8 8 . 9 9 4 . 1 88 . 9  77 . 8 75 . 0 
Wors e  100 1 00 1 00 6 2 . 5  1 00 
Entries are : p roport ion of Republi cans re cognizing the Incumbent s  
o f  the presidential p arty . 
Table S B : Di fferential S alience of the Challenge r ' s Party 
In cumbent Candidate Among the Republicans 
*5 8 *64 6 6  6 8  *1 0
Better 70 85 . 7 7 7 . 8 89 . 5 9 1 . 7
Same 9 3 . 3 94 . 7  87 . 5  94 .  7 1 00 . 0 
Wors e  1 00 10 0 70 . 0 6 2 . 5  1 00 . 0  
Entries are as define d above for the challenger party . 
*Supports the "Avenger Mode l . "
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Tab le 6A : Incumbency on S alience 
"Be tter" 
58  64 66 
Dem 100 8 8 . 4  8 5 . 3  
Rep 84 . 4  6 2 . 5 7 0  
Ind 100 2 5  50 
, _____ 
1 1 Same H  
5 8 64 66
----- -----·-
Dem 66 . 1 8 5 . 3 100 
Rep 8 6 . 6  8 8 . 2  7 7  . 8  
Ind 100 100 100 
''Wors e "  
5 8 6 4  6 6  
Dem 100 91 . 6 100 
Rep 100 100 100 
Ind 9 4 100 100 
En t ries are : o f  the d i f ferent P I D  
( Propor tion who re co gn i ze 
the presidential p arty ' s
c an di date an d  res ide in 
an are a with incumbents 
be longing t o  the p resi­
dential party . 
minus 
68
8 2 . 2
6 6 . 6
100 
6 8  
9 1. 2 
61 . 1
25 
68
8 7 . 5
25  
100  
70  
6 6 . 6  
36 . 3
8 0  
7 0  
57 . 1
5 6 . 3 
0 
7 0  
100 
100 
100  
+ 
+ 
t 
t 
+ 
+ 
t 
.j. 
t 
I 
-
( P roport ion who reco gnize 
the p re s i dent ial party ' s 
c andidate and res i de in an 
are a with a challenger 
party incumbe n t . ) 
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